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OF GRAIN MARKETING COOPERATIVES
Reynold P. Dahl*
The U.S. grain marketing system has undergone many structural changes  in the  1980's.  In no
part of the system has  structural change been more  far-reaching  and extensive than in farmer-owned
cooperatives.  The purpose of this paper is  to analyze  changes in grain marketing  and  induced
structural adjustments  in grain marketing cooperatives  at the local, regional, and  interregional
levels.  The  impact of these structural changes on the  competitive posture of cooperatives  in the
grain marketing system are also  discussed along with structural adjustments anticipated in the
1990's.
The U.S.  grain marketing system  is a dynamic system that changes
in response  to market forces.  This  is an important strength of a
private enterprise  system in contrast to  government-owned and operated
grain marketing systems that characterize many countries.  But, changes
in demand placed upon the U.S.  grain marketing system resulting from
changes  in economic variables such as  grain production, exports,
transportation and government programs are frequently abrupt and
difficult to predict.  Hence,  investments in marketing infra-structure
are often risky and sometimes painful.  The grain marketing system can
move from under capacity  to excess capacity in a short time span.  This
usually induces structural change in the  system.
Grain and soybeans have typically ranked second only to  dairy
products  in the business volume of all U.S.  agricultural marketing
cooperatives.  In 1988,  1,484 grain marketing cooperatives in the U.S.
had a total business volume of $12.4 billion  (Farmer Cooperatives,
November 1989).  But, the  share of grain and oilseed marketings by
farmers handled by cooperatives  declined in the  1980's.  The  reasons for
this decline are discussed in this paper.  But,  first, why and how did
grain marketing cooperatives develop to  achieve the important role  they
play in the U.S.  grain marketing system?
Development of Grain Marketing Cooperatives
Market failure  is frequently cited as economic justification for
agricultural marketing cooperatives.  The rapid development of local
grain marketing cooperatives  (farmers' elevators)  in the early part of
this century is a classic case in point.  The Report of  the Federal
Trade  Commission on the Grain Trade in 1920 described the competitive
situation confronting farmers  at this time as  follows:
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1"While there seems little reason to  doubt that there was
originally considerable competition between the older types of
elevators,  i.e.,  the mills,  commercial lines,  and independents,
this  competition gradually led to various agreements among
elevators, especially in the territory west of the Mississippi,
with reference to prices,  the pooling of purchases  at particular
stations,  and other practices  all more or less designed to
decrease  or eliminate competition.  In the  late nineties and early
years  of the present century such arrangements were quite
generally characteristic of country marketing conditions.  In the
northwest these practices appear  to have been especially prevalent
among commercial  line companies, which were so largely developed
in this area.  Most of these companies had their headquarters  in
the terminal market, and it was  therefore a comparatively simple
and easy thing to perfect arrangements as  to  competition between
the houses of these companies at local stations.  Farther to  the
south and east,  in Nebraska,  Iowa,  and Illinois,  where the
independents were relatively more  important than the  lines, both
types of houses were involved and the restrictions of competition
was accomplished through various  state associations  of grain
dealers,  to which associations both the independent and line
houses generally belonged."  (Report of  the Federal Trade
Commission on the Grain Trade,  p. 83.)
The development of farmers'  elevators was rapid after  1905 and by
1922  there were at  least 5,000 such concerns  in operation (Jesness, p.
26).  By the mid 1920's  the  share of grain marketings  originated by
local  farmer cooperatives ranged from 35  to  45 percent  (Bunker and
Cook).
Regional grain marketing cooperatives  developed after locals but
they also had their beginnings  in the early 1900's.  For example,  the
Equity Cooperative Exchange with headquarters  in St. Paul,  Minnesota,
was organized in 1911.  It was  an outgrowth of  feelings that conditions
in the terminal markets were working hardships on grain farmers.  The
Exchange began operations  in Minneapolis, but was barred from membership
in the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce  (the Grain Exchange),  so,  it
moved its headquarters to St.  Paul in 1914 where it built a terminal
elevator.  It also gradually acquired ownership of 85  country elevators
by October 1921.  There were many bitter encounters between the Equity
Cooperative Exchange  and the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce  (Jesness).
This culminated in a cease and desist order to the latter organization
issued by the Federal Trade Commission in 1923  (Federal Trade  Commission
v. Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis et al).
The Equity Cooperative Exchange was reorganized as  the Farmers
Union Terminal Association which became the Farmers Union Grain Terminal
Association in 1936.  The latter merged with North Pacific Grain
Growers,  another regional cooperative,  to become Harvest States
Cooperatives in 1983, which is  today the nation's  largest grain
marketing cooperative.
2Regional grain cooperatives developed rapidly from 1925-35 as the
Federal Farm Board and its  Farmers National Grain Corporation  (FNGC)
provided financial support for regional cooperatives  through which ill-
fated price stabilization activities were conducted.  The FNGC was
dissolved in 1938 and regional grain marketing cooperatives
reestablished themselves  and went on to  increase their share of grain
marketings to  21-25 percent by the  late 1970's  (Bunker and Cook).
The  Producers Export Company  (PEC) was  organized as  an
interregional grain marketing cooperative in 1958  in an attempt by 22
regional cooperatives to  integrate  their operations  into grain export
markets.  PEC was established with resources only sufficient  for
operating as  an export broker.  The PEC system of having the member
regionals of an export interregional manage and control port elevators
was identified as  a strategic problem in the  late sixties and PEC was
dissolved.  In 1968,  seven regionals formed the Farmers Export Company,
an interregional grain marketing cooperative,  and built a new port
elevator at Ama,  Louisiana  (Reynolds).
By 1977,  cooperatives had increased their share of direct grain
exports  to  11 percent of total U.S. grain exports.  They also put
through their own port elevators  (sold indirectly) another 6 percent,
making cooperatives  the seller or handler of 17 percent of U.S.  exports
of grains  (Bunker and Cook).
Regional and interregional cooperatives went on  to  increase their
annual grain volume from 1.8 billion bushels  in fiscal  1977 to  3 billion
bushels  in 1981.  In the latter year,  the Agricultural Cooperative
Service also reported 16  regional grain cooperatives  and three
interregional cooperatives  (Regional Grain Cooperatives,  1980 and 1981).
This was  the zenith year both for the  total volume of U.S.  grain exports
and also  for regional and interregional grain marketing cooperatives.
It  also marked the beginning of a decade in which a downsizing of
farmer-owned grain marketing cooperatives would occur.  To understand
the economics of these changes,  one has  to  look at  the stimulus  to
investment in marketing infrastructure resulting from the expansion of
grain exports in the  1970's.
The Grain Export Boom of the 1970's
The  1970's will go  down in history as  the golden decade for
American agriculture and its  grain marketing system.  After more than 25
years when surplus stocks and government price  support operations
dominated grain markets and marketing,  the 1972-73 marketing year
ushered in a new era.  Grain production shortfalls,  notably in the
Soviet Union, but in other countries  as  well, increased the export
demand for American grain.  U.S.  grain exports more than doubled from
1.7 billion bushels in 1971  to a record 3.5 billion bushels in 1973.
Grain prices also more than doubled in 1973  as market prices rose above
support prices.  Grain exports continued to increase  for the remainder
3of the decade reaching an all-time record of nearly 5.0 billion bushels
in 1980  (Figure 1).  The U.S.  share of the world grain export market
also rose  to a peak of 60 percent in the same year.
The grain export boom of the  1970's put a severe strain on the
marketing system, but it  accommodated this  tripling of grain exports
during the decade with a minimum of disruptions.  This was an
accomplishment of considerable magnitude.  However, marketing margins
increased as  the demand for marketing infrastructure and services
exceeded the supply.  This stimulated investments in rail cars,  barges,
storage and port facilities much of which did not come on-line until the
1980's when grain exports began an extended period of decline  (Figure
1).
Another important economic impact of the increase  in grain exports
in the  1970's was  that  it enabled the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC),  the price supporting agency of the U.S.  government,  to  dispose of
its grain stocks  that had been accumulated in the post World War II
period under price support operations.  Hence,  CCC stocks no  longer
served as a lid on market prices  so  grain price variability increased.
Greater price variability increased hedging needs which pushed the
volume of futures trading  in grain and grain products to  a record level
of  39.5 million futures contracts  in 1980.
Marketing decisions and price risk management emerged as new and
complex problems  for farmers and their grain marketing cooperatives  in
the 1970's.  Many cooperative managers were not well-equipped or  trained
to operate  in this new market environment.  Most of their experience had
been during the post World War  II period when CCC-owned grain stocks
were high and rising;  and cooperatives earned most of their income
through storage and grain handling for the  CCC.  They did not have to be
concerned with markets,  cash-futures price relationships,  and hedging.
Grain Exports Decline,  Excess Capacity Emerges in the 1980's
The decade of the  1980's  got off to an inauspicious  start with
President Carter's embargo on grain exports  to  the Soviet Union.  Also,
the world slide into a prolonged recession in which world grain trade
would decline.  U.S.  grain exports bore  the brunt of this  painful
adjustment.  Aided by a strong dollar and the price umbrella provided by
our government programs, other grain exporting countries increased their
production and provided stiffer competition for U.S. grain exports.  Our
grain exports declined nearly 2.0 billion bushels from their record high
of 5.0 billion bushels in 1980  to  3.0 billion bushels  in 1986.
Competition for the reduced volume drove marketing margins down and the
new investments in rail cars, barges,  and port elevators resulted in a
surplus of such marketing infrastructure which became burdensome.
As exports declined in the 1980's,  stocks of grain accumulated
despite sizeable acreage idled under federal farm programs.  Most of
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5 5these stocks were  stored under government programs such as  the  farmer- owned reserve,  regular price support loan,  and CCC ownership.  Grain stocks reached an all-time high of 8.4 billion bushels  at the end of the 1986/87 marketing year  (Figure 1).  The  grain marketing system was again back in the business  of storing and handling grain for the government in a big way.  The  income  from such operations  increased offsetting
declines in  income,  in part at least,  from grain merchandising
associated with reduced exports and marketing margins.  Harvest States Cooperatives,  for example,  reported a record gross  income from storage
and handling of $24.6 million in 1987.  This was  a substantial
contributor to  their net earnings from all operations  of $11 million in the same year  (Harvest States  Cooperatives,  1988 Annual Report).  This was probably typical of the operation of many local grain marketing cooperatives  during the  same period.
The world grain situation has changed again in the  last three years  resulting in an increase  of U.S.  grain exports to  4.5 billion bushels  in 1989,  but this  is  still 500 million bushels below their record level in 1980.  The drought of 1988  dramatically reduced U.S. grain production resulting in an unprecedented reduction in ending U.S. grain stocks from their record level of 8.4 billion bushels  in 1986/87 to an estimated 3.0 billion bushels  in 1989/90  (Figure 1).
This brief recap of trends  in grain exports and stocks over the past two decades illustrates how quickly and dramatically the  load placed on the  grain marketing system can change.  How has  the structure of grain marketing cooperatives changed in response to  these  changes  in demand?
Economics of Structural  Change
Cooperatives'  share of farm marketings of grain and soybeans has been substantial for many years,  but their share declined in the  1980's. The Agricultural Cooperative Service estimates  that cooperatives'  share of grain marketed by farmers declined from 36  percent in 1982  to 29 percent in 1987  (Farmer Cooperatives,  October 1989).  This was  largely attributable  to downsizing of operations at  the  regional and interregional levels, but structural change also occurred in local grain marketing cooperatives.
Unit Train Rates  Change Local Cooperative Structure
Grain cooperatives developed first at the local or country level and it  is here where cooperatives have achieved their greatest market penetration.  Local grain cooperatives have traditionally performed three important economic functions  1) grain assembly, 2) grain storage, and 3) farm supply merchandising.
6The principal marketing function performed by early local grain cooperatives was grain assembly.  They bought grain from surrounding farms and assembled it  in quantities  large enough to  ship to  terminal markets  in single rail cars.  Rail remained the  dominant transportation mode until  trucks  came  into heavy usage  after World War II.  Trucks also enabled some large farmers  to by-pass  the  local cooperative and ship directly to terminals.  Grain transport by river barge also came  into heavy usage at  this  time.  Truck and barge  transportation of grain dove- tailed well together.  Both took sizeable volumes  of business  away from the  railroads.
The railroads response to  increased truck-barge  competition was to offer special multi-car  (unit train)  rates on shipments of 25,  50,  75 or more cars.  These unit train rates were considerably lower  than single car  rates and provided a powerful  incentive for country elevators to modernize their load-out facilities  to  take  advantage of these lower rates.  It  also stimulated the  investment  in new sub-terminal elevators in the  country specifically designed to receive grain from other elevators,  and sometimes directly from farmers,  and ship  it  out in unit trains.  Multi-car shipping country elevators and the new sub-terminals expanded rapidly  in the  1970's.  Investments were facilitated by record earnings of local  elevators during this period providing equity capital for improvements.  The number of multi-car rail loading facilities  in Minnesota expanded from 19  in 1974 to  60  in 1981 and to  120  in 1987 (Table  1).  Data from other corn belt states would likely show a similar trend.  The result was excess  capacity in unit train shipping facilities in  the corn belt as  grain exports declined in the  1980's.
Table  1.  Multi-Car Rail Grain Loading Facilities  in Minnesota1-
Loading  Year
Capacity  1974  1977  1981  1983  1985  1987
(Number of Elevators)
25 car  14  29  39  39  602/  67-2/ 50 car  5  11  9  18  432/  532/ 75  car  0  0  9  10  --  --
100 car  0  0  3  3-
Total  19  40  60  70  104  120
1/  Does not include terminal  elevators in the  Twin Cities and Duluth. i2/ 15-30 cars.
_/  50-75 cars.
Source:  Yearbooks of the  Farmers' Elevator Association of Minnesota,
1974,  1977,  1981,  and 1983.  Minnesota/DOT Rail Planning, 1985 and 1987.
7The  impact of this excess capacity on local grain marketing
cooperatives  in the Eighth Farm Credit District is  analyzed by Ginder
who points out  that about  20 percent of the  firms  controlling more than
25  percent of  the industry assets were in a financially stressed
condition in late 1984.  He cautioned that if these firms are forced to
liquidate,  asset markets  for grain origination will be depressed
(Ginder, 1985).
Unit train rates were not introduced in North Dakota until July
1980,  for westbound rail,  and July 1981,  for eastbound rail.  Clow and
Wilson point out that these rates increased competition for grain which
forced country elevators  to either become larger or consolidate with
other elevators and operate as  a multi-plant firm.  Many consolidations
of cooperative elevators occurred in the 1980's and new subterminals
were constructed.  The  consolidated elevators acted as feeder stations
for new cooperative  subterminals.  This multiple-plant system enabled
the cooperative  subterminals to obtain sufficient volumes of grain for
unit train shipments.  By 1987,  there were 22 multiple-plant elevators
operating in North Dakota.  There were 116 elevators in the  state with
unit train loading capability  in January 1987.  A cost analysis in this
study showed that a multiple-plant firm must handle up to seven times
their grain storage capacity as  compared to a single-plant firm to  reach
their minimum average costs  (most efficient scale).  At no  time has  the
average been close to  the needed 22 million bushels  for multiple-plant
firms  (Clow and Wilson).
Excess capacity in unit train shipping facilities and increased
competition for grain squeezed grain merchandising margins.  This was
mitigated to some extent by increased storage  income as  carryover stocks
accumulated under government programs  in the 1980's.  Grain storage
capacity in the U.S. increased as export demand declined and stocks
accumulated under government programs.  The total of on-farm and off-
farm  (commercial) grain storage capacity reached 23 billion bushels
(nearly two years  of total U.S. yearly grain production)  on December 31,
1988.  This was up from 17 billion bushels in 1978,  an increase of 36
percent for the decade.  But,  the precipitous drop in grain stocks as a
result of the  1988 drought has resulted in excess storage capacity and
reduced storage  income for grain marketing cooperatives.
Cash Trade at Grain Exchanges and Terminals Declines
Regional cooperatives were organized to market farmers'  grain at
grain exchanges in terminal markets  such as Chicago,  Kansas City,  and
Minneapolis.  An important function of these exchanges  in earlier years
was  the marketing of single rail cars of grain on the basis of samples
consigned from country elevators  to commission firms at the exchanges.
Regional cooperatives functioned as commission firms for affiliated
local cooperatives.  But, buying and selling grain on a sample bases has
largely been replaced by forward "to arrive" cash contracts between
country elevators and grain merchants where price,  grade,  premiums and
discounts for quality, are agreed to  in the contract.  The consignment
8method of marketing grain has virtually disappeared.  Grain commission
firms have also largely disappeared or changed their operations to
become grain merchants assuming  title to  the grain they handle.  As  the
marketing of grain by sample diminished,  cash grain trade  at smaller
exchanges such as  Duluth,  St.  Louis,  Omaha, and Toledo declined even
more sharply than at the primary futures  exchanges at Chicago,  Kansas
City,  and Minneapolis.
Today most cash grain is  traded by telephone.  Merchants and
processors,  including regional cooperatives,  telephone bid prices each
day to  country elevators,  usually for forward delivery.  Forward selling
enables country elevators to  fix the price as  they purchase  grain from
farmers and have time  to  schedule load-out and shipping.  Regional
cooperatives have few captive customers among their affiliated locals.
Their price bids must be competitive with IOF's or they lose the
business.
Changes in transportation have been even larger dynamic factors
contributing to  the decline of cash grain trade  at terminal markets  and
accelerating the move  to a decentralized grain marketing system.  The
increased volume of grain shipped by truck by-passed terminal rail
markets and was not traded at grain exchanges whatsoever.  Grain was
trucked directly  to processors or to  river terminals for shipment by
barge on interior waterways.
Innovative new multi-car rates  offered by railroads  to compete
with increased truck-barge competition were point to point rates  that
did not include the transit privilege.  Transit was an integral part of
the railroad rate structure under which grain could be stopped at
intermediate points between origin and final destination for  inspection,
storage,  or processing without additional charge.  The thru rate applied
under transit billing.  As more multi-car rates were offered by  the
railroads,  the transit privilege was eroded and virtually eliminated.
The  impact of the demise of the transit privilege and deregulation
of the railroads on grain marketing channels is well-described by
Milling and Baking News as  follows:
"The more recent deregulation of the railroads which was
given legislative sanction in the Staggers Act of 1980, has meant
that  the flow of grain from origination points  in the country to
leading exchanges for resale on the cash market has diminished
sharply - to near zero,  in fact,  at Kansas City.  Increasingly,
grain moves from origination points  in the country,  or  from
gathering points in the  country,  to  its  final destination in the
U.S.  - be it a flour mill or export elevator  - without going
through a terminal market for resale.  The rail rate structure  is
no longer set by government regulation and published for all
interested parties:  rather, rates are now negotiated between the
railroad and the shipper or between the railroad and the buyer,
and in negotiating these contract rates the largest shippers have
a major advantage.  ---  The trading of individual cars  is now more
9likely to  occur near the origination point or gathering point in the  country."  ("The  Changing Face of Breadstuffs,"  pp.  47-8,
1983).
In addition to diminishing the  role of grain exchanges in the marketing of cash grain,  railroad deregulation has diminished the role of terminal elevators at these markets;  particularly,  terminal elevators built many years ago  to handle rail grain.  Many of these elevators are now obsolete for grain merchandising and are suitable only for long-term storage,  primarily of government-owned grain.
Deregulation of the railroads and the  associated unit train rates have been the principal forces tending to  decentralize the grain
marketing system.  Subterminal elevators have  taken over  the  function of many older rail terminal  elevators.  They are also  likely to replace many country elevators.  The author agrees with one analyst who projects that country elevators  that are  still operating 20 years from now will be subterminal elevators.  ("Grain Terminals Must Adopt to New Role.")
These  changes have impacted heavily on regional grain marketing cooperatives  that were originally established  to market grain at terminal locations.  Some have integrated their operations back toward the country through the ownership of local elevators and subterminals, thus becoming combination federated and centralized regional
cooperatives.  They have also integrated  forward toward export markets through the  acquisition and control of grain export marketing
infrastructure.  Problems encountered in the latter area induced many structural changes  in the  1980's.
Structural Changes  in Interregional and
Regional Grain Marketing Cooperatives
Two interregional grain marketing cooperatives failed during  the 1980's.  In addition,  two  farmer-owned regional cooperatives were dissolved;  two were reduced to joint ventures with IOF's;  and several mergers involving regional grain marketing cooperatives also occurred in the decade.  Sizeable losses  in equity capital were incurred by  the system;  and the competitive posture of farmer-owned cooperatives in the grain marketing system was weakened.  The economic reasons behind these structural changes and their performance implications deserve more analysis than they have received to date.
The Collapse of Farmers Export Company
Farmers Export Company  (FEC),  a federation of regional grain marketing cooperatives, was organized in 1968 for the purpose of marketing farmers'  grain for export.  For many years,  farmer-owned local and regional grain cooperatives had aspired to  integrate their
10operations  further up  the marketing chain by developing the capability
to  make direct sales of grain for export.  The USDA's Farmer Cooperative
Service reported in the mid-1970's  that local grain cooperatives
received about 40 percent  of farmer grain sales,  but regional
cooperatives handled only half of  that amount;  and directly exported
only 7 to 8 percent of U.S.  exports.  It recommended that cooperatives
strengthen their capability for direct export sales  (Improving the
Export Capability of Grain Cooperatives,  1976).  FEC was  to be  the major
vehicle through which this  strategy could be implemented.  It expanded
rapidly in the 1970's.  At the peak of  its operations  in 1980,  it owned
two major gulf port  terminals  in Ama,  Louisiana and Galveston, Texas.
It also  leased a 3 million bushel Philadelphia elevator and another port elevator at Portland in the Pacific northwest.  In addition,  it had
agents and offices in several major foreign cities.
But, by 1981,  even before the decline in U.S.  grain exports,  FEC experienced difficulties and began to  downsize through the  sale of port
facilities.  In 1985,  it was liquidated through the sale of its
remaining assets, which consisted mainly of its export elevator at Ama,
Louisiana,  its  first major investment  in the early 1970's,  to  the Archer
Daniels Midland Company.
The collapse of FEC was attributed to several  factors, such as  the lack of a global trading partner and a commitment  to market
cooperatively through FEC as  a central entity (Hofstead).  Another
cooperative  leader also emphasized lack of commitment as  follows:
"One was  the failure  of members  to  fully support FEC.  In fact,  at
least one regional acquired Gulf elevator assets  in direct
competition with grain flowing to  FEC, of which it was part owner"
(Torgerson, May 1986,  p. 2).
The same problem was discussed even more pointedly in Fortune as
follows:
"The bitter rivalries among the members kept them fighting about
which facilities were needed.  They seemed to have Mafia-like
designs on one another's territories and business.  A couple also
had designs on Farmers Export's foreign markets."
"AGRI Industries plunged heavily into the  export business on its
own, and last year shipped 185 million bushels  overseas through
other  facilities.  In June,  the big Iowa co-op leased an export
terminal  (which it  is now trying to buy)  in Lake Charles,
Louisiana,  that can't help but divert business away from the
Farmers Export terminal  in Ama, 175  miles away.  In September,
just as  Farmers Export's burned-out elevator in Galveston was
getting back into operation, AGRI  announced plans  to acquire a large competing elevator in Houston.  The  $36  million deal was
closed in December"  (Rowan, April 20,  1981, p. 156).
11It was also reported that the demise of FEC was hastened by losses
on large speculative positions  in futures involving old crop-new crop
price spreads  in soybeans and corn.  Operating personnel in FEC were
quoted as saying they were forced into such speculative  trading to cover
substantial overhead incurred from large  investments  in fixed assets
(Rowan, 1981).
Ginder classifies  the reasons  for the decline in cooperative
presence in export grain marketing system into  factors  inside  and
outside the  system.  He asserts that problems  outside the  system may
have been more important than the system's  internal problems.  Factors
outside the system he  sites  are:  (1) a decline in FOB-based sales
typical  of the era when PL-480 shipments dominated U.S. exports,  (2) an
increase in cost and freight  (C & F) and cost insurance and freight
(CIF) based sales,  (3) changes in ocean freight,  (4)  change  in any
origin or optional bids,  and (5)  changes  in U.S. agricultural  support
policy  (Ginder, 1988).
This writer takes  issue with his assessment of the  importance of
these  so-called external factors.  Cooperatives expanded into export
marketing with the objective of permitting more CIF grain export sales.
Other factors he mentions were hardly new to  grain export market
participants,  including grain marketing cooperatives  (Improving the
Export Capability of Grain Cooperatives,  1976).
The USDA's Agricultural Cooperative Service reported that the
collapse of Farmers Export as  "ending another chapter in the continuing
saga of grain farmers'  efforts  to  achieve a farmer-controlled grain
marketing system through vertical coordination"  (Torgerson,  May 1986, p.
2).  But,  it also marked the beginning of structural  adjustments in
other farmer-owned grain marketing cooperatives which were to  follow.
Agri-Trans Corporation Liquidated
Agri-Trans Corporation was organized as  a river barge
transportation company in the mid 1970's by CF Industries and five
regional  cooperatives,  several of which also were owners of Farmers
Export.  Its purpose was to  ship grain down river to  Gulf export
terminals and fertilizer was barged up river.  By 1981,  it owned 465
barges and nine river towboats.  As grain exports declined in the
1980's, barge rates on the river plunged.  Many new barges had been
built and added to the barge fleet resulting in excess capacity.  Agri-
Trans could not generate enough income to  cover operating expense and
debt servicing under the lower barge rate structure so it was liquidated
in 1985.
The failure of this  interregional cooperative also involved losses
in equity capital as  was the case of Farmers Export.  These losses had
to be absorbed by the regional cooperatives that held the equity capital
of Agri-Trans.
12Two Regionals Dissolved
The Producers Grain Corporation of Amarillo, Texas closed grain
operations  in 1982 with AGRI industries,  Inc.  a regional grain marketing
cooperative headquartered in Des Moines, Iowa,  taking over five terminal
elevators under a six year lease.
Far-Mar-Co.,  a regional grain marketing cooperative headquartered
in Hutchinson, Kansas, was  also liquidated in 1985.  Earlier Far-Mar-Co.
had merged with Farmland Industries,  Inc.  of Kansas City,  becoming a
subsidiary of this  regional farm supply cooperative.  Far-Mar-Co.  was
one of the owners of Farmers Export and had purchased its export
elevator in Galveston, Texas,  in 1981 when Farmers Export began to
downsize its  operations.  This purchase  increased the debt load of Far-
Mar-Co. which became increasingly burdensome as grain exports declined
and excess export marketing capacity emerged in the early 1980's.  Far-
Mar-Co.'s wheat and milo storage facilities,  including the Galveston
elevator, were sold to  the Union Equity Co-op Exchange headquartered in
Enid,  Oklahoma.  The latter is  a regional grain marketing cooperative
that exports sizeable quantities  of hard red winter wheat.
Two Regionals Become Joint Ventures with IOF's
On September 5, 1985, GROWMARK, a regional farm supply and grain
marketing cooperative headquartered in Bloomington,  Illinois and the
Archer Daniels Midland Company  (ADM) headquartered in Decatur,  Illinois,
and one  of the world's  largest grain processors,  announced a plan to
consolidate  their grain marketing and river operations  in a new ADM
subsidiary called GROWMARK Grain.  GROWMARK transferred ownership of its
seven river terminals to the new "ADM subsidiary" in exchange for ADM
common stock.  Substantially, all ADM and GROWMARK terminals on the
Illinois and Mississippi Rivers are now referred to  as  "ADM/GROWMARK."
According to  the plan as described, both firms have equal
representation on the GROWMARK Grain board of directors.  The Co-op  is
also represented on ADM's board of directors.  Kenneth P. Baer,
executive vice president and chief executive officer of GROWMARK
described the advantages  of the joint venture as  follows:  "ADM needs
and wants  our system's grain origination capability,  and we need ADM's
ability to provide equity capital,  their processing capability,  and
their worldwide marketing expertise."  ("GROWMARK and ADM Announce Plans
for Joint Grain Venture,"  Sept.  5, 1985.)
AGRI Industries,  Inc.  and Cargill,  Inc.  also formed a joint
venture beginning March 15,  1986,  called AGRI Grain Marketing.  As
described in a letter to members, AGRI  leased its  four river elevators
to the joint venture.  Cargill leased one river elevator and assigned a
second river elevator,  in which it has a lease interest,  to the joint
venture, which became an independent organization with a joint governing
board.  Despite Cargill's  51 percent controlling interest,  the joint
venture was designed to operate on an equal basis  including AGRI
13Industries members and Cargill grain and processing operations.  All
transactions will be a market prices to  insure  this equality.  The joint
venture's staff came from a merger of AGRI staff and some of Cargill's
Commodity Marketing Divisions staff in Des Moines.  Both of these
entities ceased operations as  separate independent marketing firms  in
Iowa.
With  the  integration of AGRI's grain merchandising and related
functions into the new joint venture, AGRI  Industries,  Inc. became a
holding company "functioning as a cooperative enterprise in supporting
member services and other cooperative programs"  (Coonrod, Richard A.,
Feb.  11,  1986).
Two Mergers of Regional Grain Marketing Cooperatives
The Grain Terminal Association,  St. Paul,  Minnesota, and North
Pacific Grain Growers,  Inc.,  Portland,  Oregon, merged to  form Harvest
States Cooperatives on June 1, 1983.  The new cooperative headquartered
in St.  Paul, Minnesota,  became the nation's  largest grain marketing
cooperative with revenues of $2.9 billion in the  fiscal year ending May
31,  1989.  Harvest States has  grain export facilities on  the Great Lakes
at Duluth/Superior  and the  Pacific Northwest at Kalama, Washington.  It
serves farmers  in the Upper Midwest, Pacific Northwest and adjoining
areas.  Besides grain marketing, Harvest States  Cooperatives has
sizeable  investments  in value-added grain processing operations
including soybean and sunflower seed processing;  consumer food products
distributing salad dressing and other vegetable-oil-based products  to
supermarkets;  durum milling producing semolina for pasta products;
barley malting;  and livestock feed manufacturing.
Ohio Farmers Grain and Supply Association merged with Landmark,
Inc.  to become Countrymark, Inc.  in 1985.  Countrymark then purchased
the assets of Agra Land, the cooperative that had emerged in 1983 after
the Chapter  11 bankruptcy reorganization of Michigan Farm Bureau
Services.  Mid-States Terminals,  Inc. then became a wholly-owned grain
subsidiary of Countrymark, Inc.  (Benschneider, 1987).
A more recent structural  adjustment involving Countrymark, Inc.
and the Indiana Farm Bureau Cooperative Association (I.F.B.C.A.)  is  a
joint management arrangement announced by these  two regional
cooperatives.  This,  according to  their Board Chairman, may lead  to  the
eventual joining of these cooperatives.  Countrymark and I.F.B.C.A.  are
major federated agricultural supply and grain marketing cooperatives
serving farmers  in Ohio, Michigan,  and Indiana  (Milling and Baking News,
April 24,  1990).
14A Changed Cooperative Grain Marketing System
The cooperative  grain marketing  system in 1990 is  vastly different from that of a decade earlier when U.S.  grain exports peaked.  The downsizing of interregional  and regional grain marketing cooperatives that occurred during  the decade  was necessitated by heavy  investment in grain marketing  infrastructure  during the  grain export boom.  They were not strong  enough to  ride out  the  lean times of the  1980's.  The  share of total  export elevator storage capacity controlled by cooperatives declined from 21 percent  in 1981  to  15 percent  in 1989  (Table  2).  Also, most of  this capacity  is  now located on the Great  Lakes,  the  export point  through which the  smallest  amount of U.S.  grain exports  move. Cooperatives no  longer control export space  at the Mississippi  Gulf through which  the largest  share  of U.S.  grain exports  flow.
The share of port capacity held by the  five major multinational grain exporting firms  (Cargill,  Inc.;  Continental  Grain Company;  Bunge Corp.;  Louis Dreyfus  Corp.;  and Garnac Grain  Co.,  Inc.)  also  declined from 50  percent to  46 percent  during the same  period.  On the other hand,  the  share of port storage capacity held by  "other"  firms  increased from 28 percent  to  39 percent.  Two of  the  larger multiple port facility firms  in the  "other" category  include the Archer-Daniels Midland  Company and Con Agra,  Inc.  Both have expanded their grain operations  in  recent years.
Table  2.  Percentage  of Total Export  Elevator Storage Capacity
Controlled by Exporter Group,  1981 and  1989.
Exporter  Group  19811/  19892/
5 Major Multinationals_/  50.3  46.0
Farmers  wned Cooperatives  21.4  15.3 Others  28.3  38.7
Total 
100.0  100.0
i/  Neilson C. Conklin and Reynold P. Dahl,  "Organization and Pricing Efficiency of the U.S.  Grain Export System."  Minnesota Agricultural Economist,  Agric. Ext.  Service,  University of Minnesota, No.  635,  May 1982,  p. 3.
A2./  Export Elevator Directory,  U.S. Dept.  of Agric.,  Federal Grain Inspection Service,  January 1989.
3/  Includes  Cargill,  Continental,  Bunge,  Dreyfus,  and Garnac. Includes public elevators and elevators operated by port authorities.
15Most knowledgeable students  could hardly conclude  that the U.S.
system of regional grain marketing cooperatives has become stronger over
the past decade.  But,  the strongest part of the  farmer-owned grain
marketing system has traditionally been in grain organization through
local  cooperatives.  Many local grain marketing cooperatives have grown
in size and scope of operations as  they have  expanded through  internal
growth, mergers,  and consolidations.  Their larger operations and
capabilities of handling unit train shipments indicate  that they have
taken on more of the characteristics of sub-terminals shipping  directly
to  domestic users or ports  for export.  Hence,  many are not as dependent
upon the services of a regional cooperative in marketing single cars of
grain as  in years past.  This presents  a challenge to  the regionals  in
the provision of other services to  their federated locals.
Structural Change  in the 1990's
The number of grain marketing cooperatives in the U.S.  declined
from  2,475 in 1978  to  2,065  in  1987  (Farmer Cooperative Statistics,
1987).  A continuation of this  trend can be expected in the 1990's.
Excess capacity in unit train loading facilities may also result in
further restructuring of  local grain marketing cooperatives.  Value-
added activities such as  the contract feeding of livestock are also
being tried by some local grain marketing cooperatives in parts of  the
corn belt.  Such activities demand a new set of management skills  in
addition to  those required for grain and farm supply merchandising.
At  the regional  level,  we will probably witness more joint
ventures between cooperatives and between cooperatives and IOF's.
Value-added grain processing operations will also receive greater
emphasis.  Harvest States  Cooperatives provides an interesting case
study.  It downsized its  grain marketing operations,  but expanded its
value-added grain processing operations  in the  1980's  to make it  less
vulnerable  to  the ups and downs of the grain business.  Such operations
include  (1) The Feed Division has expanded into more products such as
pet food manufacturing under private labels  for food chains,  (2)
Honeymeade Processing produces  and refines soybean oil and meal.
Honeymeade purchased an I.O.F.  called Holsum Foods  that manufactures
margarines,  salad dressings, peanut butter and shortenings.  They are
also one of  the  largest importers of bulk olives and produce about  80
percent of the preserves sold by Kraft, and (3)  Amber Milling grinds
durum into semolina and durum flour.  Harvest States Cooperatives  is one
of the largest originators of durum in the United States.  Pasta
consumption in the U.S.  has been increasing at an average annual rate of
7 to 9 percent for several years.  The expected annual  growth rate in
the 1990's  is  5 to  6 percent  (Pistoria).
16Partnership with I.O.F.  in Durum Milling
The  increased demand for pasta was  the motivating force behind a recent expansion in Harvest States durum milling operations.  It formed a partnership with the Miller Milling Company,  an I.O.F.,  of Huron,
Ohio,  where its mill will be expanded from 6,000 hundredweight  to  12,000 hundredweight per day.  Harvest States  is  the operating partner and
retains  the majority interest in the partnership.  With this expansion,
Amber Milling becomes the second largest durum miller in the U.S.
grinding about  14 million bushels of durum per year  (Division Report of Amber Milling at 1989 Annual Meeting).
Two Regionals Invest in Wheat Flour Milling
Union Equity Cooperative Exchange and Harvest States Cooperatives
recently acquired a combined 10 percent ownership of Cereal Food
Processors.  This  I.O.F. headquartered in Mission Woods,  Kansas  is  the nation's fifth  largest flour miller and operates nine flour mills  in six states,  as  well as  a dry corn mill.  This alliance will expand the cooperatives'  operations  in the value-added product sector and enhance the milling company's access to high quality wheat.  The presidents of the  two cooperatives will be elected  to  the board of directors of Cereal Foods  (Milling and Baking News,  June  26,  1990).  The wheat flour milling industry has shown impressive growth over the past  two decades.  The per capita consumption of wheat flour in the U.S.  increased from 110 lbs. per capita in 1971  to  129  lbs.  per capita in 1989.
Another joint venture between Harvest States Cooperatives and Union Equity Cooperative Exchange called Harvest Equity,  Inc.  based in Lincoln, Nebraska is  also worthy of mention.  This  company specializes in cross  country grain trading and currently provides  the only
cooperative alternative  in its  geographic market (Harvest  States
Journal,  March/April 1990).
Conclusions
The grain export boom of the 1970's put a severe strain on the marketing system.  Marketing margins increased as  the demand for marketing infrastructure exceeded the  supply.  This stimulated
investments  in rail  cars, barges, storage and port facilities.  Much of this new equipment came on-line when grain exports declined in the 1980's resulting in excess capacity, reduced marketing margins,  firm consolidation,  and downsizing.  Structural change has been extensive in farmer-owned cooperatives.
The cooperative grain marketing system in 1990 is vastly different from that of a decade earlier when U.S.  grain exports peaked.  Two interregional cooperatives failed;  two regional cooperatives were
17dissolved;  two regionals were reduced to joint ventures with I.O.F.'s;
and several mergers involving regional grain marketing cooperatives
occurred in the decade.  Sizeable losses  in equity capital were incurred by the system, and the  share of grain marketed by farmer-owned
cooperatives  declined.
Changes  in grain marketing,  transportation,  and railroad de-
regulation have resulted in a decline  in grain exchanges and terminal grain markets  in the marketing of cash grain.  The grain marketing
system has become more decentralized with grain moving directly from gathering points  in the country to  domestic users or  to ports  for export.  Many local grain marketing cooperatives  have expanded to handle unit train shipments.  Others have consolidated to  form sub-terminals
which are replacing many country elevators;  and are also taking over the function of older rail terminal elevators.  These changes have impacted heavily on regional grain marketing cooperatives  that were originally
established to market grain for  local affiliated cooperatives at
terminal locations.
Structural change in the  cooperative grain marketing system will likely continue  in the  1990's.  The number of local grain marketing
cooperatives will probably continue  to decline.  The precipitous  decline in grain stocks  in  1988-89 resulted in a reduced income from storage and handling government-owned grain stocks for most local cooperatives.
Excess capacity in unit train shipping in many areas has  also squeezed grain merchandising margins.
Both local and regional cooperatives will place more emphasis on value-added operations  such as  grain processing and contract  feeding of livestock that are less  subject to  the ups and downs of grain
merchandising.  We will probably witness new innovations  in joint ventures between cooperatives and between cooperatives and IOF's  in the 1990's.  The economics of joint ventures  and their implications for cooperatives  and agribusiness organization will demand increased study by students of agricultural  cooperation in years ahead.
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